The Epistemic Role of Consciousness

New York, USA: Oxford University Press (2019)
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Abstract

What is the role of consciousness in our mental lives? Declan Smithies argues here that consciousness is essential to explaining how we can acquire knowledge and justified belief about ourselves and the world around us. On this view, unconscious beings cannot form justified beliefs and so they cannot know anything at all. Consciousness is the ultimate basis of all knowledge and epistemic justification.

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Declan Smithies
Ohio State University

Citations of this work

Mental Representation.David Pitt - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Degrees of Consciousness.Andrew Y. Lee - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):553-575.
Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.

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References found in this work

Introspecting phenomenal states.Brie Gertler - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):305-28.

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