Symposium 4 (1):89-115 (2000)

For Husserl, the natural attitude - and hence any further explication of it - is put out of play, bracketed by the phenomenological epoché, which, of course, is not to deny its existence, but only to turn our theoretical gaze elsewhere. As Husserl remarks, “the single facts, the facticity of the natural world taken universally, disappear from our theoretical regard”. The project of the young Heidegger, I will argue, is precisely a concern with facticity, taking up this forgotten project in phenomenology, and thus attempting an explication of the natural attitude, considered so “extraordinarily important” by Husserl. Heidegger thus effects something of a relocation of phenomenology, turning its analysis to a different site: pretheoretical experience. Further, Heidegger also seeks to honor the precognitive nature of this pretheoretical experience, or what he will call faktische Lebenserfahrung. As such, the young Heidegger is very concerned with Husserl’s “theoreticization” of factical life. To avoid the same in his ‘new’phenomenology, Heidegger must develop a new conceptuality: the “formal indication”.Selon Husserl, l’attitude naturelle - et toute explication de celle-ci - est mise hors d’usage, mise entre parenthèses par l’epoche, laquelle ne nie pas son existence, mais fait détourner notre regard théorique. Comme le remarque Husserl: «les faits singuliers, la facticité du monde naturel pris dans son universalité, disparaissent de notre regard théorique». Je soutiendrai que le projet du jeune Heidegger consiste précisément en une préoccupation de la facticité, reprenant ainsi un projet oublié de la phénoménologie, et tâchant ainsi d’expliquer l’attitude naturelle, si «extraordinairement importante» aux yeux de Husserl. Ainsi, Heidegger institue une sorte de redéfinition de la phénoménologie, fixant son analyse à un lieu différent: l’expérience préthéorique. De plus, Heidegger cherche é reconnaître la nature précognitive de cette experience préthéorique, ou ce qu’il appellera faktische Lebenserfahrung. Ainsi, Heidegger est hautement préoccupé par la «théorisation» husserlienne de la vie factuelle. Pour éviterune telle chose dans sa «nouvelle» phénoménologie, Heidegger doit développer une conceptualisation nouvelle: l’indication formelle.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  Continental Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 1917-9685
DOI symposium2000415
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