The mental lives of zombies

Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372 (2012)
Authors
Declan Smithies
Ohio State University
Abstract
Could there be a cognitive zombie – that is, a creature with the capacity for cognition, but no capacity for consciousness? Searle argues that there cannot be a cognitive zombie because there cannot be an intentional zombie: on this view, there is a connection between consciousness and cognition that is derived from a more fundamental connection between consciousness and intentionality. However, I argue that there are good empirical reasons for rejecting the proposed connection between consciousness and intentionality. Instead, I argue that there is a connection between consciousness and cognition that is derived from a more fundamental connection between consciousness and rationality. On this view, there cannot be a cognitive zombie because there cannot be a rational zombie.
Keywords consciousness  cognition  zombies  rationality  intentionality  functionalism  belief  subdoxastic state
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DOI 10.1111/phpe.12013
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References found in this work BETA

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

A New Puzzle About Belief and Credence.Andrew Moon - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-20.
The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology.Declan Smithies - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):744-754.
Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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