The Normative Role of Knowledge

Noûs 46 (2):265-288 (2012)
Abstract
What is the normative role of knowledge? I argue that knowledge plays an important role as a norm of assertion and action, which is explained and unified by its more fundamental role as a norm of belief. Moreover, I propose a distinctive account of what this normative role consists in. I argue that knowledge is the aim of belief, which sets a normative standard of correctness and a corresponding normative standard of justification. According to my proposal, it is correct to believe, assert and act on a proposition if and only if one is in a position to know it, but one has justification to believe, assert and act on a proposition if and only if one has justification to believe that one is in a position to know it.
Keywords knowledge  epistemic norms  assertion  practical reasoning  action  justification  belief
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00787.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,300
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification.Paul Silva Jr - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).
Doxastic Correctness.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.
Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
Some Thoughts on the JK-Rule1.Martin Smith - 2012 - Noûs 46 (4):791-802.

View all 28 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Justification as the Appearance of Knowledge.Steven L. Reynolds - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):367-383.
Some Thoughts on the JK-Rule1.Martin Smith - 2012 - Noûs 46 (4):791-802.
Knowledge in the Image of Assertion.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):1-19.
Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms.Clayton Littlejohn - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.
Two Ways to Put Knowledge First.Alexander Jackson - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):353 - 369.
Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - In C. Littlejohn & J. Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms. Oxford University Press.
The Aim of Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 36 (s16):267-97.
In What Sense is Knowledge the Norm of Assertion?Pascal Engel - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):45-59.
Added to PP index
2010-10-29

Total downloads
313 ( #10,041 of 2,193,222 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #7,058 of 2,193,222 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature