Truthmaker realism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):274 – 291 (1999)
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Abstract

We take as our starting point a thesis to the effect that, at least for true judgments of many varieties, there are parts of reality which make such judgments are true. We argue that two distinct components are involved in this truthmaker relation. On the one hand is the relation of necessitation, which holds between an object x and a judgment p when the existence of x entails the truth of p. On the other hand is the dual notion of projection, which holds between a judgment p and an object x when the truth of p entails the existence of x. A truthmaker for a judgment p is then a necessitator for p which satisfies the further constraint that it is part of p’s projection. We offer a formal theory of the truthmaker relation thus defined, exploiting ontological tools of basic mereology and the theory of dependence. We then apply the theory to a range of problems connected with generic expressions, ellipsis, vagueness, and indexical and perceptual judgments

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Barry Smith
State University of New York, Buffalo

Citations of this work

Why Truthmaking Is Not a Case of Grounding.Paul Audi - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):567-590.
Truthmaker Commitments.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):7-19.
Fiat Objects.Barry Smith - 2001 - Topoi 20 (2):131-148.
The Growing-Block: Just One Thing After Another?Graeme Forbes & Rachael Briggs - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):927-943.

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References found in this work

A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
Parts: A Study in Ontology.Peter Simons - 1987 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Parts: A Study in Ontology.Peter Simons - 1987 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Parts : a Study in Ontology.Peter Simons - 1987 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 2:277-279.

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