Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (2):203–223 (1999)
AbstractThere are two prevailing interpretations of the status which Kant accorded his claims in the Critique of Pure Reason: 1) he is analyzing our concepts of cognition and experience; 2) he is making empirical claims about our cognitive faculties. I argue for a third alternative: on Kant's account, all cognition consists in a reflective consciousness of our cognitive faculties, and in critique we analyze the content of this consciousness. Since Strawson raises a famous charge of incoherence against such a position, I begin by showing that this charge is misplaced.
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Citations of this work
Transcendental Philosophy As Capacities‐First Philosophy.Karl Schafer - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):661-686.
Epistemic Agency and the Self-Knowledge of Reason: On the Contemporary Relevance of Kant’s Method of Faculty Analysis.Thomas Land - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 13):3137-3154.
Varieties of Reflection in Kant's Logic.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2015 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (3):478-501.
C. I. Lewis, Kant, and the Reflective Method of Philosophy.Gabriele Gava - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (2):315-335.
How to Solve the Knowability Paradox with Transcendental Epistemology.Andrew Stephenson - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 13):3253-3278.
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