Brentano-Studien 4:35–51 (1992)

Barry Smith
State University of New York, Buffalo
From the point of view of Brentano’s philosophy, contemporary philosophy of mind presupposes an over-crude theory of the internal structures of mental acts and states and of the corresponding types of parts, unity and dependence. We here describe Brentano’s own account of the part-whole structures obtaining in the mental sphere, and show how it opens up new possibilities for mereological investigation. One feature of Brentano’s view is that the objects of experience are themselves parts of mind, so that there is a sense in which for him (as e.g. for Leibniz) ontology is a proper part of rational or descriptive psychology.
Keywords dependence relations  logical parts  immanence  Aristotelian psychology
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Reprint years 1992/93
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References found in this work BETA

Franz Brentano on the Ontology of Mind.Kevin Mulligan & Barry Smith - 1985 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (4):627-644.

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Citations of this work BETA

Brentano’s Mereology.Wilhelm Baumgartner & Peter Simons - 1994 - Axiomathes 5 (1):55-76.
Franz Brentano.Wolfgang Huemer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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