Abstract

This article responds to Jeremy Waldron's claim that the truth or falsity of moral objectivism makes no difference to the arbitrariness, or otherwise, of adjudication (the ‘no‐difference thesis’). I start by outlining the way in which I believe objectivism and its opponents should be distinguished, before setting out Waldron's arguments in favour of the no‐difference thesis. I then consider a number of ambiguities in that thesis, before criticizing several attempts by Michael Moore to respond to Waldron's arguments. Having cleared the way for a new consideration of this issue, I argue that—depending on which interpretation of them we accept—Waldron's arguments: (i) misrepresent the nature of the debate between objectivists and anti‐objectivists; (ii) beg the question by asserting that objectivism is wrong rather than irrelevant; or (iii) rely upon an indefensible account of political justification. Finally, I offer an example of how the truth or falsity of objectivism can have implications for adjudication, by suggesting two ways in which it may affect the legitimacy of judicial review