Underdetermination and closure: Thoughts on two sceptical arguments

In Duncan Pritchard & Matthew Jope (ed.), New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure. Routledge (2022)
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Abstract

In this paper, I offer reasons for thinking that two prominent sceptical arguments in the literature – the underdetermination-based sceptical argument and the closure-based sceptical argument – are less philosophically interesting than is commonly supposed. The underdetermination-based argument begs the question against a non-sceptic and can be dismissed with little fanfare. The closure-based argument, though perhaps not question-begging per se, does rest upon contentious assumptions that a non-sceptic is under no pressure to accept.

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Martin Smith
University of Edinburgh

References found in this work

The significance of philosophical scepticism.Barry Stroud - 1984 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Epistemic operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge.John McDowell - 1988 - In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Perceptual knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 455-79.

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