Authors
Marion Smiley
Brandeis University
Abstract
This article has three parts. The first argues that excuses such as "I didn't know" and "I couldn't help myself" are not, as we are frequently led to believe, vehicles for discovering whether or not an individual's will was free. Instead, they are self-narratives that we produce for the purpose of avoiding blame. The second part explores the particular notion of non-responsibility that governs these self-narratives. The third articulates the role that our judgments of fairness play in decisions to accept or reject pleas of ignorance and mental incompetence in particular cases.
Keywords Excuses  Blame  Blameworthiness  Ignorance  Mental impairment
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11097-014-9367-x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,514
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Two Faces of Responsibility.Gary Watson - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):227-248.
Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment.Angela M. Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):367 - 392.
Culpability and Ignorance.Gideon Rosen - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1):61-84.

View all 22 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Volitional Excuses, Self-Narration, and Blame.Marion Smiley - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):85-101.
Brains, Blame, and Excuses.Jason Cruze - 2014 - Philosophia Christi 16 (2):433-442.
Moral Beliefs and Blameworthiness.Lloyd Fields - 1994 - Philosophy 69 (270):397 - 415.
Explaining (Away) the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility.Gunnar Björnsson - 2017 - In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition. Oxford University Press. pp. 146–162.
A Theory of the Normative Force of Pleas.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):479-502.
Blame.D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2014 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Responsibility, Liability, Excuses and Blame.Alan White - 1973 - Studi Internazionali Di Filosofia 5:63-70.
Blame Transfer.Jan Willem Wieland & Philip Robichaud - forthcoming - In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition. Oxford University Press.
Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance.Holly M. Smith - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2):115-146.
Puzzling About State Excuses as an Instance of Group Excuses.François Tanguay-Renaud - forthcoming - In R. A. Duff, L. Farmer, S. Marshall & V. Tadros (eds.), The Constitution of the Criminal Law. Oxford University Press.
A Sketch of a Theory of Moral Blameworthiness.Peter A. Graham - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):388-409.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-04-13

Total views
35 ( #279,479 of 2,348,166 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #237,421 of 2,348,166 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes