Vague singulars, semantic indecision, and the metaphysics of persons

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):569-585 (2007)
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Composite materialism, as I will understand it, is the view that human persons are composite material objects. This paper develops and investigates an argument, The Vague Singulars Argument, for the falsity of composite materialism. We shall see that cogent or not, the Vague Singulars Argument has philosophically significant ramifications


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Author's Profile

Donald Smith
Virginia Commonwealth University

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - London and New York: Routledge.
Material Beings.Peter van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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