What We Know When We Know a Language
In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 941 (2006)
Abstract
EVERY speaker of a language knows a bewildering variety of linguistic facts, and will come to know many more. It is knowledge that connects sound and meaning. Questions about the nature of this knowledge cannot be separated from fundamental questions about the nature of language. The conception of language we should adopt depends on the part it plays in explaining our knowledge of language. This chapter explores options in accounting for language, and our knowledge of language, and defends the view that individuals’ languages are constituted by the standing knowledge they carry from one speech situation to another.Reprint years
2009
DOI
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.003.0037
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Citations of this work
Linguistic Intuitions.Gareth Fitzgerald - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (1):123-160.
Methodology, not metaphysics: Against semantic externalism.John Collins - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):53-69.
II—M ethodology, not M etaphysics: A gainst S emantic E xternalism.John Collins - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):53-69.
Knowledge of Grammar and Concept Possession.Edison Barrios - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):577-606.
Explaining Reference: A Plea for Semantic Psychologism.Santiago Echeverri - 2014 - In Julien Dutant, Davide Fassio & Anne Meylan (eds.), Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel. University of Geneva. pp. 550-580.
