Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23 (1988)

Abstract
A set of hypotheses is formulated for a connectionist approach to cognitive modeling. These hypotheses are shown to be incompatible with the hypotheses underlying traditional cognitive models. The connectionist models considered are massively parallel numerical computational systems that are a kind of continuous dynamical system. The numerical variables in the system correspond semantically to fine-grained features below the level of the concepts consciously used to describe the task domain. The level of analysis is intermediate between those of symbolic cognitive models and neural models. The explanations of behavior provided are like those traditional in the physical sciences, unlike the explanations provided by symbolic models
Keywords Cognition  Connectionism  Psychology
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x00052432
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References found in this work BETA

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Vison.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.

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Natural Language and Natural Selection.Steven Pinker & Paul Bloom - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):707-27.
Finding Structure in Time.Jeffrey L. Elman - 1990 - Cognitive Science 14 (2):179-211.

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