Less good but not bad: In defense of epicureanism about death

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):197-227 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this article I defend innocuousism– a weak form of Epicureanism about the putative badness of death. I argue that if we assume both mental statism about wellbeing and that death is an experiential blank, it follows that death is not bad for the one who dies. I defend innocuousism against the deprivation account of the badness of death. I argue that something is extrinsically bad if and only if it leads to states that are intrinsically bad. On my view, sometimes dying may be less good than living, but it is never bad to die

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,363

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

How bad is death?Ben Bradley - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):111-127.
The Time of Death's Badness.J. Johansson - 2012 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (5):464-479.
Why is death bad?Anthony L. Brueckner & John Martin Fischer - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (2):213-221.
The Metaphysics of Death.John Martin Fischer (ed.) - 1993 - Stanford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-01-07

Downloads
675 (#13,348)

6 months
9 (#96,235)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Aaron Smuts
Rhode Island College

Citations of this work

A Simple Analysis of Harm.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
Causal Accounts of Harming.Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):420-445.
A dilemma for Epicureanism.Travis Timmerman - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):241-257.
Dissolving Death’s Time-of-Harm Problem.Travis Timmerman - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):405-418.
Accounting for the Harm of Death.Duncan Purves - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):89-112.

View all 20 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Utilitarianism.J. S. Mill - 1861 - Oxford University Press UK.
Death.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Noûs 4 (1):73-80.
The Limits of Well-Being.Shelly Kagan - 1992 - Social Philosophy and Policy 9 (2):169-189.

View all 10 references / Add more references