Less good but not bad: In defense of epicureanism about death

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):197-227 (2012)
Abstract
In this article I defend innocuousism– a weak form of Epicureanism about the putative badness of death. I argue that if we assume both mental statism about wellbeing and that death is an experiential blank, it follows that death is not bad for the one who dies. I defend innocuousism against the deprivation account of the badness of death. I argue that something is extrinsically bad if and only if it leads to states that are intrinsically bad. On my view, sometimes dying may be less good than living, but it is never bad to die
Keywords death  extrinsic value  Ben Bradley  Fred Feldman  innocuousism  Epicurus
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01423.x
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Accounting for the Harm of Death.Duncan Purves - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):89-112.
To Be or Never to Have Been: Anti-Natalism and a Life Worth Living.Aaron Smuts - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (4):1-19.

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