The liar paradox in new clothes

Analysis 72 (2):319-322 (2012)
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Next SectionCharlie Pelling presents an impropriety paradox for the truth account of assertion. After solving his paradox I show that it is a version of the liar paradox. I then show that for any account of truth there is a strengthened liar-like paradox, and that for any solution to the strengthened liar paradox, there is a parallel solution to each of these “new” paradoxes



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Jeff Snapper
University of Notre Dame

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Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
``Must we Know What we Say?".Matt Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.

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