Analysis 72 (2):319-322 (2012)

Jeff Snapper
University of Notre Dame
Next SectionCharlie Pelling presents an impropriety paradox for the truth account of assertion. After solving his paradox I show that it is a version of the liar paradox. I then show that for any account of truth there is a strengthened liar-like paradox, and that for any solution to the strengthened liar paradox, there is a parallel solution to each of these “new” paradoxes
Keywords liar paradox  vagueness  truth
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DOI 10.1093/analys/ans040
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