Philosophy Compass 10 (6):379-388 (2015)

Authors
Justin Snedegar
University of St. Andrews
Abstract
Contrastivism about some concept says that the concept is relativized to sets of alternatives. Relative to some alternatives, the concept may apply, but relative to others, it may not. This article explores contrastivism about the central normative concepts of reasons and ought. Contrastivism about reasons says that a consideration may be a reason for an action A rather than one alternative, B, but may not be a reason for A rather than some other alternative, C. Likewise, contrastivism about ought says that it might be that you ought to perform action A rather than action B, while it is not the case that you ought to perform A rather than some other alternative, C. It explores the shape and motivations for, and the relationship between, these contrastivist theories.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1111/phc3.12231
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,018
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.

View all 32 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc: Some Benefits of Rationalization.Jesse S. Summers - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1):21-36.
Exploitation and Effective Altruism.Daniel Muñoz - 2021 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 20 (4):409-423.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Reason Claims and Contrastivism About Reasons.Justin Snedegar - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):231-242.
Ethics and Contrastivism.Justin Snedegar - 2014 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Defending Contrastivism.Martijn Blaauw - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (1):59-64.
A Contrastivist Manifesto.Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):257 – 270.
Contrastivism and Lucky Questions.Kelly Becker - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (2):245-260.
Contrastivism in Epistemology.Martijn Blaauw - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):227 – 234.
Deontic Reasoning Across Contexts.Justin Snedegar - 2014 - In F. Cariani (ed.), DEON 2014. Springer. pp. 208-223.
Undermining the Case for Contrastivism.Ram Neta - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):289 – 304.
Contrastivism and Closure.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):247 – 256.
Negative Reason Existentials.Justin Snedegar - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):108-116.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-06-04

Total views
86 ( #133,727 of 2,498,530 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #118,753 of 2,498,530 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes