In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

Authors
Justin Snedegar
University of St. Andrews
Abstract
This chapter investigates different ways that pro tanto reasons bearing on our options can compete with one another in order to determine the overall normative status of those options. It argues for two key claims: (i) any theory of this competition must include a distinct role for reasons against, in addition to reasons for, and (ii) any theory must allow for comparative verdicts about how strongly supported the options are by the reasons, rather than simply which options are permissible or required. A simple balancing account and an account based on a distinction between requiring and justifying reasons are rejected, and a new account giving a distinct role for reasons against is introduced.
Keywords reasons  requirements  ought  weighing reasons
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Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
How Do Reasons Accrue?Shyam Nair - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. Oxford University Press. pp. 56–73.

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