Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):682-702 (2019)

Authors
Justin Snedegar
University of St. Andrews
Abstract
A plausible constraint on normative reasons to act is that it must make sense to use them as premises in deliberation. I argue that a central sort of deliberation – what Bratman calls partial planning – is question-directed: it is over, and aims to resolve, deliberative questions. Whether it makes sense to use some consideration as a premise in deliberation in a case of partial planning can vary with the deliberative question at issue. I argue that the best explanation for this is that reasons are contrastive or relativized to deliberative questions.
Keywords Deliberation  Partial plans  Reasons  Contrastivism  Reasoning
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12262
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References found in this work BETA

Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):574-576.
The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).

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Citations of this work BETA

No Reasons to Believe the False.Javier González De Prado Salas - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):703-722.
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