Like-Minded: Externalism and Moral Psychology

The MIT Press (2011)
The debate has continued in these terms to the present day. In Like-Minded, Andrew Sneddon argues that "reason" and "passion" do not satisfactorily capture all the important options for explaining the psychological foundations of morality.
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ISBN(s) 0262016117   9780262016117
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