Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (4):447-455 (2009)
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Abstract |
The familiar argument from disagreement has been an important focal point of discussion in contemporary meta-ethics. Over the past decade, there has been an explosion of interdisciplinary work between philosophers and psychologists about moral psychology. Working within this trend, John Doris and Alexandra Plakias have made a tentative version of the argument from disagreement on empirical grounds. Doris and Plakias present empirical evidence in support of premise 4, that ethics is beset by fundamental disagreement. They examine Richard Brandt on Hopi ethics and, especially, Richard E. Nisbett & Dov Cohen on cultures of honor to make a prima facie version of this case. This raises important questions. Are Doris and Plakias correct that there is even a prima facie empirical basis for moral anti-realism? What sort of empirical contribution can be made to such debates in meta-ethics? I argue that we should have reservations about the prospects of empirical contributions to the argument from disagreement. Specifically, before empirical results from psychology can be used to offer conclusions about meta-ethical issues, more careful attention must be paid to normative ethics, and especially to normative theory. There are two parts to this position. First, there is good reason to think that the evidence we currently have about moral disagreement is irrelevant to the meta-ethical debate. Second, the relevant evidence is useless for meta-ethical purposes on its own. Instead, it must be combined with normative theorizing about value pluralism
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Keywords | argument from disagreement ethics moral psychology |
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DOI | 10.1007/s10790-009-9164-x |
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Against Overgeneralisation Objections to the Argument From Moral Disagreement.Thomas Pölzler - 2020 - South African Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):261-273.
Moral Realism, Moral Disagreement, and Moral Psychology.Simon Fitzpatrick - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (2):161-190.
The Argument From Agreement: How Universal Values Undermine Moral Realism.Hanno Sauer - 2019 - Ratio 32 (4):339-352.
Editor's Introduction.Diego E. Machuca - 2013 - In D. E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge.
What Should Realists Say About Honor Cultures?Dan Demetriou - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (5):893-911.
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