Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):108-116 (2013)

Justin Snedegar
University of St. Andrews
(Schroeder 2007) presents a puzzle about negative reason existentials—claims like ‘There's no reason to cry over spilled milk’. Some of these claims are intuitively true, but we also seem to be committed to the existence of the very reasons that are said not to exist. I argue that Schroeder's own pragmatic solution to this puzzle is unsatisfactory, and propose my own based on a contrastive account of reasons, according to which reasons are fundamentally reasons for one thing rather than another, instead of reasons for things simpliciter, as has been traditionally held
Keywords contrastive reasons  contrastivism  reasons  pragmatics  reason ascriptions
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.70
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):574-576.
Moral Skepticisms.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
Nonfactualism About Epistemic Modality.Seth Yalcin - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Contrastivism and Negative Reason Existentials.Eric Gilbertson - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):69-78.

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