Reason claims and contrastivism about reasons

Philosophical Studies 166 (2):231-242 (2013)
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Abstract

Contrastivism about reasons is the view that ‘reason’ expresses a relation with an argument place for a set of alternatives. This is in opposition to a more traditional theory on which reasons are reasons for things simpliciter. I argue that contrastivism provides a solution to a puzzle involving reason claims that explicitly employ ‘rather than’. Contrastivism solves the puzzle by allowing that some fact might be a reason for an action out of one set of alternatives without being a reason for that action out of a different set of alternatives

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Justin Snedegar
University of Virginia

Citations of this work

Simple Probabilistic Promotion.Eden Lin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):360-379.
Contrastive Intentions.Andrew Peet - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (4):24.

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On What Matters: Volume Three.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.

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