The depths and shallows of psychological externalism

Philosophical Studies 138 (3):393 - 408 (2008)
This paper examines extant ways of classifying varieties of psychological externalism and argues that they imply a hitherto unrecognized distinction between shallow and deep externalism. The difference is between starting points: shallowly externalist hypotheses begin with the attribution of psychological states to individuals, just as individualistic hypotheses do, whereas deeply externalistic hypotheses begin with agent-environment interaction as the basis of cognitive processes and attribute psychological states to individuals as necessary for such interaction. The over-arching aim is to show how deep externalism works and what its implications are for psychological and philosophical theorizing.
Keywords Externalism  Psychology  Content externalism  Vehicle externalism  Taxonomical externalism  Locational externalism  Individualism  System  Wilson  CAPS  Rowlands  Mischel
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-006-9058-8
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