Taking Empirically Minded Moral Philosophy Seriously

Dialogue 40 (3):603- (2001)

Andrew Sneddon
University of Ottawa
This is a critique of Wayne Fenske's attempt to provide an a posteriori defense of internalism and consequently an argument against the possibility of amoralism.
Keywords amoralism  Millikan  Fenske
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DOI 10.1017/S0012217300018953
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