The dissociation paradigm and its discontents: How can unconscious perception or memory be inferred?

Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):107-116 (2004)
Abstract
Erdelyi does us all a great service by his customarily incisive discussion of the various ways in which our field tends to neglect, confuse, and misunderstand numerous critical issues in attempting to differentiate conscious from unconscious perception and memory. Although no single commentary could hope to comprehensively assess these issues, I will address Erdelyi’s three main points: How the dissociation paradigm can be used to validly infer unconscious perception; The implications of below-chance effects; and The role of time. I suggest that significant progress on construct validity issues is possible; below-chance effects are part of a more general bidirectional phenomenon, very likely unconscious, and do not threaten absolute subliminality; and practice/learning effects pose potential difficulties for time-based dissociation paradigms
Keywords *Dissociation  *Subliminal Perception  *Subliminal Stimulation  *Time
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DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2003.11.001
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Priming with and Without Awareness.J. Cheesman & Philip M. Merikle - 1984 - Perception and Psychophysics 36:387-95.
Replicable Unconscious Semantic Priming.Sean Draine & Anthony G. Greenwald - 1998 - Journal Of Experimental Psychology-General 127 (3):286-303.

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