Beyond Singular Propositions?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):515 - 549 (1995)
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Abstract

Propositional attitudes, like believing and asserting, are relations between agents and propositions. Agents are individuals who do the believing and asserting; propositions are things that are believed and asserted. Propositional attitude ascriptions are sentences that ascribe propositional attitudes to agents. For example, a propositional attitude ascription α believes, or asserts, that S is true iff the referent of a bears the relation of believing, or asserting, to the proposition expressed by s. The questions I will address have to do with the precise nature of propositions, and the attitudes, like belief, that we bear to them.I will assume both that propositions are the semantic contents of sentences, and that the proposition expressed by a sentence is a structured complex made up of the semantic contents of the parts of the sentences that express it.

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Scott Soames
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

Suspended judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.
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Specifying Desires.Delia Graff Fara - 2012 - Noûs 47 (2):250-272.
Propositional attitude reports.Thomas McKay - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Themes from Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein - 1990 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 180 (3):572-573.
Substitutivity.Scott Soames - 1987 - In Judith Jarvis Thomson (ed.), On Being and Saying: Essays for Richard Cartwright. MIT Press. pp. 99-132.
Frege's Puzzle. [REVIEW]Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):455.

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