Direct reference, propositional attitudes, and semantic content

In Philosophical Essays, Volume 2: The Philosophical Significance of Language. Princeton University Press. pp. 33-71 (2009)
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Scott Soames
University of Southern California
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DOI 10.1515/9781400833184.33
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