Propositions as Cognitive Acts

Synthese 196 (4):1369-1383 (2019)

Scott Soames
University of Southern California
The paper reviews the central components of the cognitive theory of propositions and explains both its empirical advantages for theories of language and mind and its foundational metaphysical and epistemological advantages over other theories. It then answers a leading objection to the theory, before closing by raising the issue of how questions, which are the contents of interrogative sentences, and directives, which are the contents of imperative sentences, are related to propositions.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-016-1168-z
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References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Rethinking Language, Mind, and Meaning.Scott Soames - 2015 - Princeton University Press.
On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.

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Citations of this work BETA

Phenomenal Dispositions.Henry Ian Schiller - forthcoming - Synthese:1-12.
Neutral Predication.Thomas Hodgson - 2019 - Erkenntnis:1-9.

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