Fact, fiction, and fitness: A reply to Rosenberg

Journal of Philosophy 81 (7):372-383 (1984)
Abstract
Alexander Rosenberg begins his recent article on the concept of fitness with the remark that "debates about the cognitive status of the Darwinian theory of natural selection should have ended long ago." I agree that this obsession needs to be overcome. But Rosenberg repeats some of the old mis- takes and invents epicycles on others. In this comment I will not be able to circumscribe fully the range of topics that an adequate treatment of this cluster of problems demands. A few critical re marks will indicate what I find wanting in Rosenberg's treatment
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.2307/2026292
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,820
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Reply to Martin and Rosenberg.Roland Puccetti - 1976 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (March):139-141.
Reply to Rosenberg on Genic Selectionism.Elliott Sober & Richard C. Lewontin - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):648-650.
On the Propensity Definition of Fitness.Alexander Rosenberg - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (2):268-273.
Adequacy Criteria for a Theory of Fitness.Alex Rosenberg - 1991 - Biology and Philosophy 6 (1):38-41.
Fitness as Primitive and Propensity.Alexander Rosenberg & Mary Williams - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (3):412-418.
Fitness, Probability and the Principles of Natural Selection.Frédéric Bouchard & Alex Rosenberg - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4):693-712.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
30 ( #186,521 of 2,210,114 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #382,810 of 2,210,114 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature