Pain for objectivists: The case of matters of mere taste

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):437 - 457 (2005)

Authors
David Sobel
Syracuse University
Abstract
Can we adequately account for our reasons of mere taste without holding that our desires ground such reasons? Recently, Scanlon and Parfit have argued that we can, pointing to pleasure and pain as the grounds of such reasons. In this paper I take issue with each of their accounts. I conclude that we do not yet have a plausible rival to a desire-based understanding of the grounds of such reasons.
Keywords practical reason  subjectivism  Scanlon  Parfit  tastes
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10677-005-8839-z
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Morals by Agreement.David Gauthier - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point.R. M. Hare (ed.) - 1981 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Impartial Reason.Stephen L. Darwall - 1983 - Cornell University Press.
Morality and Action.Warren Quinn - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure.Ben Bramble - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.
How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal.Murat Aydede - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):119-133.
Attitudinal and Phenomenological Theories of Pleasure.Eden Lin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.
Sobel on Pleasure, Reason, and Desire.Attila Tanyi - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):101-115.
Acquired Taste.Kevin Melchionne - 2007 - Contemporary Aesthetics.
Pain, Qualia, and the Explanatory Gap.Donald F. Gustafson - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):371-387.
Pleasure, Desire and Oppositeness.Justin Klocksiem - 2010 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2):1-7.
Parfit on What Matters in Survival.Anthony Brueckner - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (1):1-22.
Parfit's Case Against Subjectivism.David Sobel - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 6. Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
247 ( #25,988 of 2,264,670 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #39,545 of 2,264,670 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature