Pain for objectivists: The case of matters of mere taste

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):437 - 457 (2005)
Can we adequately account for our reasons of mere taste without holding that our desires ground such reasons? Recently, Scanlon and Parfit have argued that we can, pointing to pleasure and pain as the grounds of such reasons. In this paper I take issue with each of their accounts. I conclude that we do not yet have a plausible rival to a desire-based understanding of the grounds of such reasons.
Keywords practical reason  subjectivism  Scanlon  Parfit  tastes
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10677-005-8839-z
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Morals by Agreement.David Gauthier - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Morality and Action.Warren Quinn - 2012 - Cambridge University Press.
Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point.R. M. Hare (ed.) - 1981 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Impartial Reason.Stephen L. Darwall - 1983 - Cornell University Press.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure.Ben Bramble - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.
Pluralism About Well‐Being.Eden Lin - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):127-154.
How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal.Murat Aydede - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):119-133.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Parfit on What Matters in Survival.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (1):1-22.
Pleasure, Desire, and Oppositeness.Justin Klocksiem - 2010 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
Pain, Qualia, and the Explanatory Gap.Donald F. Gustafson - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):371-387.
Acquired Taste.Kevin Melchionne - 2007 - Contemporary Aesthetics.
Sobel on Pleasure, Reason, and Desire.Attila Tanyi - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):101-115.
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.
Parfit's Case Against Subjectivism.David Sobel - 2011 - In Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 6. Oxford University Press.
Added to PP index

Total downloads
173 ( #29,561 of 2,214,511 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
23 ( #15,932 of 2,214,511 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature