Synthese 108 (1):11 - 61 (1996)
A person who does not have good intellectual reasons for believing in God can, depending on his probabilities and values for consequences of believing, have good practical reasons. Pascalian wagers founded on a variety of possible probability/value profiles are examined from a Bayesian perspective central to which is the idea that states and options are pragmatically reasonable only if they maximize subjective expected value. Attention is paid to problems posed by representations of values by Cantorian infinities. An appendix attends to Robinsonian hyperreals. Another appendix presents for comparison Newcomb's Problem and a problem in some ways like it suggested, I think, by ideas of John Calvin.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals.David Hume - 1975 - Oxford University Press.
Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe.Richard Holton - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):63 – 76.
The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and Against the Existence of God.J. L. Mackie - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
On the Significance of Conditional Probabilities.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1996 - Synthese 109 (3):311 - 344.
Similar books and articles
When Fair Betting Odds Are Not Degrees of Belief.T. Seidenfeld, M. J. Schervish & J. B. Kadane - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:517-524.
Threats to Democratic Rationality.Kristin A. Wagers & Bruce Tonn - 2010 - World Futures 66 (8):597-625.
Scepticism, Evidentialism and the Parity Argument: A Pascalian Perspective.Robert Holyer - 1989 - Religious Studies 25 (2):191 - 208.
Gentlemen's Wagers: Relevant Logic and Probability.C. Van Fraassen Bas - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 43 (1):47-61.
Explaining Our Own Beliefs: Non-Epistemic Believing and Doxastic Instability. [REVIEW]Ward E. Jones - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 111 (3):217 - 249.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads53 ( #98,059 of 2,163,682 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #188,898 of 2,163,682 )
How can I increase my downloads?