Pascalian Wagers

Synthese 108 (1):11 - 61 (1996)
Abstract
A person who does not have good intellectual reasons for believing in God can, depending on his probabilities and values for consequences of believing, have good practical reasons. Pascalian wagers founded on a variety of possible probability/value profiles are examined from a Bayesian perspective central to which is the idea that states and options are pragmatically reasonable only if they maximize subjective expected value. Attention is paid to problems posed by representations of values by Cantorian infinities. An appendix attends to Robinsonian hyperreals. Another appendix presents for comparison Newcomb's Problem and a problem in some ways like it suggested, I think, by ideas of John Calvin.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00414004
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References found in this work BETA
Problems of the Self.Bernard A. O. Williams - 1973 - Cambridge University Press.
Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe.Richard Holton - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):63 – 76.

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Citations of this work BETA
Pascal's Wager and the Nature of God.Greg Janzen - 2011 - Sophia 50 (3):331-344.

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