In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (forthcoming)

Authors
David Sobel
Syracuse University
Abstract
Libertarian self-ownership views in the tradition of Locke, Nozick, and the left-libertarians have supposed that we enjoy very powerful deontological protections against infringing upon our property. Such a conception makes sense when we are focused on property that is very important to its owner, such as a person’s kidney. However, this stringency of our property rights is harder to credit when we consider more trivial infringements such as very mildly toxic pollution or trivial risks such having planes fly overhead. Maintaining that our rights against all infringements are very powerful threatens to implausibly make such pollution and trivial risk broadly impermissible. This paper suggests that self-ownership views have tended to inappropriately conflate the seriousness of different types of infringements and that treating all infringements so seriously is implausible because it would make too much impermissible. I consider several ways to avoid this result within a self-ownership framework and conclude that the best approach is to allow that the strength of the protection against infringements should be tied to the seriousness of the harm of the infringement.
Keywords Political Philosophy  Ethics  Libertarianism  Property Rights  Nozick  Left-Libertarianism  Natural Rights
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Betterness of permissibility.Benjamin Ferguson & Sebastian Köhler - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2451-2469.
Duty-Sensitive Self-Ownership.Ben Bryan - 2019 - Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (2):264-283.

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