In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. New York, USA: Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

Authors
David Sobel
Syracuse University
Abstract
This paper examines possible interpretations of the Demandingness Objection as it is supposed to work against Consequentialist ethical theories.
Keywords Demandingness Objection, Consequentialism, moral theory, ethics,
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