Authors
David Sobel
Syracuse University
Abstract
Many philosophers maintain that neither one’s reasons for action nor well-being are ever grounded in facts about what we desire or favor. Yet our reasons to eat a flavor of ice cream we like rather than one we do not seem an obvious counter-example. I argue that there is no getting around such examples and that therefore a fully stance independent account of the grounding of our reasons is implausible. At least in matters of mere taste our “stance” plays a normative role in grounding reasons.
Keywords reasons  subjectivism  well-being
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DOI 10.26556/jesp.v15i2.517
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References found in this work BETA

Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):89-174.
Normative Requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
.Peter Railton - 1985 - Rowman & Littlefield.
Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid.Ruth Chang - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Robust Hybrid Theory of Well-Being.Steven Wall & David Sobel - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):2829-2851.

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