Synthese 115 (3):355-373 (1998)
This paper proposes a game-theoretic solution of the surprise examination problem. It is argued that the game of “matching pennies” provides a useful model for the interaction of a teacher who wants her exam to be surprising and students who want to avoid being surprised. A distinction is drawn between prudential and evidential versions of the problem. In both, the teacher should not assign a probability of zero to giving the exam on the last day. This representation of the problem provides a diagnosis of where the backwards induction argument, which “proves” that no surprise exam is possible, is mistaken.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
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Citations of this work BETA
The Surprise Exam Paradox, Rationality, and Pragmatics: A Simple Game‐Theoretic Analysis.José Luis Ferreira & Jesús Zamora Bonilla - 2008 - Journal of Economic Methodology 15 (3):285-299.
The Surprise Examination in Dynamic Epistemic Logic.J. Gerbrandy - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):21-33.
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