Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 10:205-216 (2003)
Carl Hempel1 set the tone for subsequent philosophical work on scientific explanation by resolutely locating the problem he wanted to address outside of epistemology. “Hempel’s problem,” as I will call it, was not to say what counts as evidence that X is the explanation of Y. Rather, the question was what it means for X to explain Y. Hempel’s theory of explanation and its successors don’t tell you what to believe; instead, they tell you which of your beliefs (if any) can be said to explain a given target proposition.
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Citations of this work BETA
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Bayesian Cognitive Science, Unification, and Explanation.Stephan Hartmann & Matteo Colombo - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv036.
Playing with Networks: How Economists Explain. [REVIEW]Caterina Marchionni - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (3):331-352.
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