The other as Alter ego: A genetic approach

Husserl Studies 15 (3):151-166 (1998)
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It is an ancient view, to be found even in Aristotle’s analysis of friendship, that the other is an alter ego, another myself. More recently, this conception has provoked spirited debate within and without the phenomenological tradition. It can be found in a wide variety of texts, from Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations to Thomas Nagel’s “What is it like to be a bat?” The basic position can be summarized as follows. Intentional experiences are subjective, first-person experiences, not objective, third-person experiences.



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The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl.Alfred Schutz - 2010 - Schutzian Research. A Yearbook of Worldly Phenomenology and Qualitative Social Science 2:11-53.

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