Husserl Studies 24 (3):167-175 (2008)
Husserl’s Idea of Phenomenology is his first systematic attempt to show how phenomenology differs from natural science and in particular psychology. He does this by the phenomenological reduction. One of his achievements is to show that the formal structures of intentionality are more akin to logic than to psychology. I claim that Husserl’s argument can be made more intuitive if we consider phenomenology to be the study of truth rather than knowledge, and if we see the reduction as primarily a modification in our vocabulary and discourse and not as simply a change in attitude. I briefly compare Husserl’s concept of philosophy with those of Plato and Kant.
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Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2002 - Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
The Nocturnal Council and Platonic Political Philosophy.V. Lewis - 1998 - History of Political Thought 19 (1):1-20.
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