Review of Metaphysics 49 (1):144-147 (1995)

Robert Sokolowski
Catholic University of America
One of the major points in Husserl's philosophy is his insistence that consciousness is structured. He denies that consciousness is simply an undifferentiated awareness and that all the differences occur in the content or object of consciousness. He claims that consciousness itself is articulated; it has parts ordered into different kinds of wholes. The most vivid examples of this articulation are found in "representational" forms of consciousness such as remembering or imaging an experience. Let us say that I remember getting into a taxi last evening. My remembering is dual and involves the memorial reenactment of a prior perceptual activity. I "relive," so to speak, myself getting into the taxi yesterday evening, and I do so now, while sitting in a chair in my office. This dual pattern of consciousness, however, this parallelism between my present remembering and my past experience, is entirely focused on one object, on the taxi as being perceived and entered by me.
Keywords Catholic Tradition  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0034-6632
DOI revmetaph1995491118
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