Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):588-589 (1998)

Abstract
There are problems with Atran's argument for an innate cognitive module for folk biology. He has been too quick to assume innate origins for what might plausibly be learned. Furthermore, in his characterization he includes aspects – essentialist reasoning and inductions from classes – that are not domain-specific. Finally, his characterization compromises his argument that the module is pretheoretical.
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x98431273
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