Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):353 – 363 (1995)

Authors
Miriam Solomon
Temple University
Abstract
Naturalistic epistemologists frequently assume that their aim is to identify generalities (i.e. general laws) about the effectiveness of particular reasoning processes and methods. This paper argues that the search for this kind of generality fails. Work that has been done thus far to identify generalities (e.g. by Goldman, Kitcher and Thagard) overlooks both the complexity of reasoning and the relativity of assessments to particular contexts (domain, stage and goal of inquiry). Examples of human reasoning which show both complexity and contextuality are given. The paper concludes with a discussion of the kind of multivariate model of reasoning that naturalistic epistemologists can use to evaluate processes and methods for specific domains.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515089508573164
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,268
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.

View all 25 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Naturalisms in Philosophy of Mind.Steven Horst - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):219-254.
Is the Generality Problem Too General?Michael Levin - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):87 - 97.
Kitcher, Mathematics, and Naturalism.Jeffrey W. Roland - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):481 – 497.
The Specificity of the Generality Problem.Earl Conee - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):751-762.
Issue Spotting in CHASER.Barbara Cuthill & Robert McCartney - 1993 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 2 (2):83-111.
Why the Generality Problem is Everybody’s Problem.Michael A. Bishop - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):285 - 298.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-05-07

Total views
10 ( #799,925 of 2,325,401 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #664,323 of 2,325,401 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes