Noneism, Ontology, and Fundamentality


Authors
Tatjana von Solodkoff
University College Dublin
Richard Woodward
Universität Hamburg
Abstract
In the recent literature on all things metaontological, discussion of a notorious Meinongian doctrine—the thesis that some objects have no kind of being at all—has been conspicuous by its absence. And this is despite the fact that this thesis is the central element of the noneist metaphysics of Richard Routley (1980) and Graham Priest (2005). In this paper, we therefore examine the metaontological foundations of noneism, with a view to seeing exactly how the noneist's approach to ontological inquiry differs from the orthodox Quinean one. We proceed by arguing that the core anti-Quinean element in noneism has routinely been misidentified: rather than concerning Quine's thesis that to be is to be the value of a variable, the real difference is that the noneist rejects what we identify as Quine's “translate-and-deflate” methodology. In rejecting this aspect of Quinean orthodoxy, the noneist is in good company: many of those who think that questions of fundamentality should be the proper focus of ontological inquiry can be read as rejecting it too. Accordingly, we then examine the differences between the noneist's conception of ontology and that offered by the fundamentalist. We argue that these two anti-Quinean approaches differ in terms of their respective conceptions of the theoretical role associated with the notion of being. And the contrast that emerges between them is, in the end, an explanatory one.
Keywords Metametaphysics  Metaontology  Quine  Noneim  Fundamentality  Ontology
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205  
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12054
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References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.W. V. Quine - 1969 - Columbia University Press.
The Question of Realism.Kit Fine - 2001 - Philosophers' Imprint 1:1-30.

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Citations of this work BETA

Should Metaphysics Care About Linguistics?Tobias Rosefeldt - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (2):161-178.
Paraphrase Strategies in Metaphysics.Tatjana von Solodkoff - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (8):570-582.

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