Synaesthesia and the Relevance of Phenomenal Structures in Perception

Abstracta 5 (2):139-153 (2009)
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The aim of the present paper is to sketch a new structural version of the Representative Theory of Perception which is supported both by conceptual and empirical arguments. To this end, I will discuss, in a first step, the structural approach to representation and show how it can be applied to perceptual consciousness. This discussion will demonstrate that perceptual experiences possess representational as well as purely sensational properties. In a second step, the focus will switch to empirical cases of synaesthesia. In particular, I will stress that certain synaesthetic experiences are well-suited to corroborating a structural account of the perceptual mind. The overall picture that emerges in this paper prompts a new view of perceptual consciousness that is ruthlessly structural.



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Michael Sollberger
University of Lausanne

Citations of this work

Rethinking synesthesia.Michael Sollberger - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):171 - 187.

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References found in this work

Fundamental aspects of cognitive representation.Stephen Palmer - 1978 - In Eleanor Rosch & Barbara Lloyd (eds.), Cognition and Categorization. Lawrence Elbaum Associates. pp. 259-303.
Meaning and Mental Representation.Robert Cummins - 1990 - Mind 99 (396):637-642.
Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint.Stephen E. Palmer - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):923-943.

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