Why Supervenience is a Problem for Brink's Version of Moral Realism

Abstract
The aim of this paper is to show that David Brink’s influential version of moral realism cannot give a convincing explanation of moral supervenience. Section twocontains an outline and discussion of Brink’s view of moral properties. Section three explicates Brink’s notions of strong and weak supervenience. In sections four and five, Brink’s explanation of moral supervenience is discussed. It is argued that his functionalist view of moral properties means that the explanation of moral supervenience that he explicitly offers is not satisfactory. A suggestion is also made about what the exact nature is of the explanatory challenge that Brink faces inrelation to moral supervenience. Finally, it is argued that Brink cannot meet this challenge
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 1053-8364
DOI 10.5840/jpr_2008_10
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