Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):251-264 (2007)

Authors
Roy Sorensen
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
Surprisingly, the fact that the speaker is lying is sometimes common knowledge between everyone involved. Strangely, we condemn these bald-faced lies more severely than disguised lies. The wrongness of lying springs from the intent to deceive – just the feature missing in the case of bald-faced lies. These puzzling lies arise systematically when assertions are forced. Intellectual duress helps to explain another type of non-deceptive false assertion : lying to yourself. In the end, I conclude that the apparent intensity of our disapproval of non-deceptive lies is a rhetorical illusion
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00290.x
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Way of Words.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Frege: Philosophy of Language.Michael Dummett - 1973 - Philosophy 49 (190):438-442.

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Citations of this work BETA

Lying with Presuppositions.Emanuel Viebahn - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):731-751.
Lying, Speech Acts, and Commitment.Neri Marsili - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3245-3269.
Lying and Asserting.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (1):33-60.
The Definition of Lying and Deception.James Edwin Mahon - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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