Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):251-264 (2007)
Surprisingly, the fact that the speaker is lying is sometimes common knowledge between everyone involved. Strangely, we condemn these bald-faced lies more severely than disguised lies. The wrongness of lying springs from the intent to deceive – just the feature missing in the case of bald-faced lies. These puzzling lies arise systematically when assertions are forced. Intellectual duress helps to explain another type of non-deceptive false assertion : lying to yourself. In the end, I conclude that the apparent intensity of our disapproval of non-deceptive lies is a rhetorical illusion
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Implicit Bias, Confabulation, and Epistemic Innocence.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:548-560.
Davidson Was Almost Right About Lying.Don Fallis - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):337-353.
Bald-Faced Lies: How to Make a Move in a Language Game Without Making a Move in a Conversation.Jessica Keiser - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):461-477.
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