Yablo's paradox and Kindred infinite liars

Mind 107 (425):137-155 (1998)

Authors
Roy Sorensen
Washington University in St. Louis
Abstract
This is a defense and extension of Stephen Yablo's claim that self-reference is completely inessential to the liar paradox. An infinite sequence of sentences of the form 'None of these subsequent sentences are true' generates the same instability in assigning truth values. I argue Yablo's technique of substituting infinity for self-reference applies to all so-called 'self-referential' paradoxes. A representative sample is provided which includes counterparts of the preface paradox, Pseudo-Scotus's validity paradox, the Knower, and other enigmas of the genre. I rebut objections that Yablo's paradox is not a genuine liar by constructing a sequence of liars that blend into Yablo's paradox. I rebut objections that Yablo's liar has hidden self-reference with a distinction between attributive and referential self-reference and appeals to Gregory Chaitin's algorithmic information theory. The paper concludes with comments on the mystique of self-reference.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/107.425.137
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References found in this work BETA

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Citations of this work BETA

What Truth Depends On.Hannes Leitgeb - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (2):155-192.
A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability.Igor Douven - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):391-410.
Circularity and Paradox.Stephen Yablo - 2006 - In Thomas Bolander, Vincent F. Hendricks & Stig Andur Pedersen (eds.), Self-Reference. CSLI Publications. pp. 139--157.

View all 47 citations / Add more citations

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Circularity and Paradox.Stephen Yablo - 2006 - In Thomas Bolander, Vincent F. Hendricks & Stig Andur Pedersen (eds.), Self-Reference. CSLI Publications. pp. 139--157.
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