Beyond scepticism, to the best of our knowledge

Mind 97 (386):153-188 (1988)
Epistemology is too far-flung and diverse for a survey in a single essay. I have settled for a snapshot which, though perforce superficial and partial, might yet provide an overview. My perspective is determined by the books and articles prominent in the recent literature and in my own recent courses and seminars. Seeing that the boundaries of our field have shifted through the ages and are even now very ill-marked, I have chosen two central issues, each under vigorous and many-sided discussion in recent years and at present: (A) Scepticism, and (B) Theories of Justification; and in each case I shall focus on work either published or widely discussed within the last five years.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/XCVII.386.153
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J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard (2015). Knowledge‐How and Cognitive Achievement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):181-199.
Duncan Pritchard (2009). Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64 (64):19-43.

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