Dubious assertions

Philosophical Studies 146 (2):269 - 272 (2008)

Authors
David Sosa
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
The knowledge account of assertion—roughly: one should not assert what one does not know—aspires to identify the norm distinctive of assertion. One main argument given in support of the knowledge account has been the success with which it explains a variety of Moore-paradoxical assertion. But that explanation does not generalize satisfactorily.
Keywords Norms of assertion  Knowledge account  Moore’s paradox
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Reprint years 2009
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9255-8
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Norms of Assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.

View all 22 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

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Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.
Iteration and Fragmentation.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):656-673.

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