Philosophical Issues 6:91-99 (1995)
What is involved in acquiring a russellian proposition (x, φ) as content of an attitude: what does it take for one to acquire such an attitude de re? How do we gain access to x itself so as to be able to have (x, φ) as content of our thought?
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19-48.
Ontological Minimalism About Phenomenology.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.
Similar books and articles
Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):595-639.
Reflections on Reference and Reflexivity.Kent Bach - 2007 - In Michael O'Rourke Corey Washington (ed.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. pp. 395--424.
An Argument Against Fregean That-Clause Semantics.Adam Pautz - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):335 - 347.
Colour Constancy and Fregean Representationalism.Boyd Millar - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):219-231.
Direct Reference in Thought and Speech.Kirk A. Ludwig - 1993 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 26 (1):49-76.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads37 ( #131,984 of 2,126,920 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #201,338 of 2,126,920 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.