Philosophical Perspectives 13:137-49 (1999)
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Abstract |
What modal relation must a fact bear to a belief in order for this belief to constitute knowledge of that fact? Externalists have proposed various answers, including some that combine externalism with contextualism. We shall find that various forms of externalism share a modal conception of “sensitivity” open to serious objections. Fortunately, the undeniable intuitive attractiveness of this conception can be explained through an easily confused but far preferable notion of “safety.” The denouement of our reflections, finally, will be to show how replacing sensitivity with safety makes it possible to defend plain Moorean common sense against the spurious advantages over it claimed by skeptical, tracking, relevant-alternative, and contextualist accounts.
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Keywords | safety |
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DOI | 10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.7 |
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Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):70-90.
The normality of error.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2509-2533.
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